DOCUMENTS

Kolinsky, R., Monteiro-Plantin, R. S., Mengarda, E. J., Grimm-Cabral, L., Scliar-Cabral, L., & Morais, J. (2014). How formal education and literacy impact on the content and structure of semantic categories. Trends in Neuroscience and Education, 3, 106-121. DOI: 10.1016/j.tine.2014.08.001

We examined the hypothesis that formal education and literacy impact the richness and precision of semantic knowledge but not the organization of semantic categories and basic mechanisms of access to them.
In Experiment 1, adults of varying levels of formal education were presented with semantic fluency tests and a superordinate naming task. Experiment 2 examined the impact of reading proficiency on adults of varying degrees of literacy. They were presented with simple semantic, alternating semantic and phonemic fluency tasks, as well as with literacy-related, reasoning and memory tests.
Fluency was analyzed in terms of overall performance, sequential order and speed of responses. Despite lower performance, illiterates and adults with null or limited formal education displayed taxonomic clustering and retrieval by semantic subcategory, as did participants with higher formal education levels. Yet, formal education and literacy slightly speed up access to categories, probably providing useful cues for generating category exemplars.

Timmermans, B., & Cleeremans, A. (2015). How can we measure awareness? An overview of current methods. In M. Overgaard (Ed.), Behavioural Methods in Consciousness Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21-46.

Unpronounceable strings of 4 consonants (conditioned stimuli: CSs) were consistently
followed by familiar words belonging to one of two opposed semantic categories
(unconditioned stimuli: USs). Conditioning, in the form of greater accuracy in rapidly
classifying USs into their categories, was found when visually imperceptible (to most
subjects) CSs occupied ≥ 58 ms of a 75-ms CS–US interval. When clearly visible CSs
were presented in a 375 ms CS–US interval, conditioning was strongly correlated with
measures of contingency awareness, and did not occur in the absence of that awareness.
These experiments delineated two forms of conditioning: Unconscious conditioning
occurred with a brief CS–US interval, with an effectively masked CS, and with no
reportable knowledge of the contingent CS–US relation. Conscious conditioning
occurred with a substantially longer CS–US interval, a perceptible CS, and with subjects’
reportable knowledge of the contingent CS–US relation.

Maes, E., De Filippo, G., Inkster, A., Lea, S. E. G., De Houwer, J., D'Hooge, R., Beckers, T., & Wills, A. J. (in press). Feature- versus rule-based generalization in rats, pigeons and humans. Animal Cognition.

Abstract:
Humans can spontaneously create rules that allow them to efficiently generalize what they have learned to novel situations. An enduring question is whether rule-based generalization is uniquely human or whether other animals can also abstract rules and apply them to novel situations. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile claims that animals such as rats can learn rules. Most of those claims are quite weak because it is possible to demonstrate that simple associative systems (which do not learn rules) can account for the behavior in those tasks. Using a procedure that allows us to clearly distinguish feature-based from rule-based generalization (the Shanks-Darby procedure), we demonstrate that adult humans show rule-based generalization in this task, while generalization in rats and pigeons was based on featural overlap between stimuli. In brief, when learning that a stimulus made of two components (“AB”) predicts a different outcome than its elements (“A” and “B”), people spontaneously abstract an opposites rule and apply it to new stimuli (e.g. knowing that “C” and “D” predict one outcome, they will predict that “CD” predicts the opposite outcome). Rats and pigeons show the reverse behavior – they generalize what they have learned, but on the basis of similarity (e.g. “CD” is similar to “C” and “D”, so the same outcome is predicted for the compound stimulus as for the components). Genuinely rule-based behavior is observed in humans, but not in rats and pigeons, in the current procedure.

Maes, E., De Filippo, G., Inkster, A., Lea, S.E.G., De Houwer, J., D'Hooge, R., Beckers, T., Wills, A.J. (2015). Animal Cognition

Humans can spontaneously create rules that allow them to efficiently generalize what they have learned to novel situations. An enduring question is whether rule-based generalization is uniquely human or whether other animals can also abstract rules and apply them to novel situations. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile claims that animals such as rats can learn rules. Most of those claims are quite weak because it is possible to demonstrate that simple associative systems (which do not learn rules) can account for the behavior in those tasks. Using a procedure that allows us to clearly distinguish feature-based from rule-based generalization (the Shanks-Darby procedure), we demonstrate that adult humans show rule-based generalization in this task, while generalization in rats and pigeons was based on featural overlap between stimuli. In brief, when learning that a stimulus made of two components (“AB”) predicts a different outcome than its elements (“A” and “B”), people spontaneously abstract an opposites rule and apply it to new stimuli (e.g. knowing that “C” and “D” predict one outcome, they will predict that “CD” predicts the opposite outcome). Rats and pigeons show the reverse behavior – they generalize what they have learned, but on the basis of similarity (e.g. “CD” is similar to “C” and “D”, so the same outcome is predicted for the compound stimulus as for the components). Genuinely rule-based behavior is observed in humans, but not in rats and pigeons, in the current procedure.

Mertens, G., Kuhn, M., Raes, A. K., Kalisch, R., De Houwer, J., & Lonsdorf, T. B. (In press). Fear expression and the return of fear following threat instruction with or without direct contingency experience. Cognition and Emotion.

Prior research showed that mere instructions about the contingency between a Conditioned Stimulus (CS) and an Unconditioned Stimulus (US) can generate fear reactions to the CS. Little is known, however, about the extent to which actual CS-US contingency experience adds anything beyond the effect of contingency instructions. Our results extend previous studies on this topic in that it included fear potentiated startle as an additional dependent variable and examined return of fear following reinstatement. We observed that CS-US pairings can enhance fear reactions beyond the effect of contingency instructions. Moreover, for all measures of fear, instructions elicited immediate fear reactions that could not be completely overridden by subsequent situational safety information. Finally, return of fear following reinstatement for instructed CS+s was unaffected by actual experience. In sum, our results demonstrate the power of contingency instructions and reveal the additional impact of actual experience of CS-US pairings.

Van Dessel, P. , De Houwer, J., Roets, A., & Gast, A. (2016). Failures to change stimulus evaluations by means of subliminal approach and avoidance training. Journal of Social and Personality Psychology, 110, e1-e15.

Previous research suggests that the repeated performance of approach and avoidance (AA) actions in response to a stimulus causes changes in stimulus evaluations. Kawakami, Phills, Steele, and Dovidio (2007) and Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, and Fazio (2013) provided evidence that these AA training effects occur even when stimuli are presented only subliminally. We also examined whether reliable AA training effects can be observed with subliminal stimulus presentations but added more sensitive checks of perceptual stimulus discriminability. Three experiments, including a direct replication of the study by Kawakami et al. (2007), failed to provide any evidence for effects of subliminal AA training on implicit or explicit evaluations. Bayesian analyses indicated that our data provide robust evidence that subliminal AA training does not cause changes in evaluations. In contrast, we observed changes in evaluations when participants were provided with (either correct or incorrect) information about the stimulus-action contingencies in the subliminal AA training task and when participants performed a supraliminal AA training task that allowed participants to detect these contingencies. These findings support the idea that contingency awareness is necessary for the occurrence of AA training effects.

Bardi, L., Bundt, C., Notebaert, W. & Brass, M. (2015). Eliminating mirror responses via instructions. Cortex, 70, 128-136.

The observation of an action leads to the activation of the corresponding motor plan in the observer. This phenomenon of motor resonance has an important role in social interaction, promoting imitation, learning and action understanding. However, mirror responses not always have a positive impact on our behavior. An automatic tendency to imitate others can introduce interference in action execution and non-imitative or opposite responses have an advantage in some contexts. Previous studies suggest that mirror tendencies can be suppressed after extensive practice or in complementary joint action situations revealing that mirror responses are more flexible than previously thought. The aim of the present study was to gain insight into the mechanisms that allow response flexibility of motor mirroring. Here we show that the mere instruction of a counter-imitative mapping changes mirror responses as indexed by motor evoked potentials (MEPs) enhancement induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Importantly, mirror activation was measured while participants were passively watching finger movements, without having the opportunity to execute the task. This result suggests that the implementation of task instructions activates stimulus-response association that can overwrite the mirror representations. Our outcome reveals one of the crucial mechanisms that might allow flexible adjustments of mirror responses in different contexts. The implications of this outcome are discussed.

Kolinsky, R., Demoulin, C., & Morais, J. (in press). Les effets de l’acquisition de l’écrit sur le traitement du langage, la mémorisation et la connaissance verbale. Ed. SOLAL – DE BOECK.

Anzulewicz, A., Asanowicz, D. , Windey, B., Paulewicz, B., Wierzchon, M. & Cleeremans, A. (2015). Does level of processing affect the transition from unconscious to conscious perception? Consciousness and Cognition, 36, 1-11.

Abstract:

Recently, Windey, Gevers, and Cleeremans (2013) proposed a level of processing (LoP) hypothesis claiming that the transition from unconscious to conscious perception is influ- enced by the level of processing imposed by task requirements. Here, we carried out two experiments to test the LoP hypothesis. In both, participants were asked to classify briefly presented pairs of letters as same or different, based either on the letters’ physical features (a low-level task), or on a semantic rule (a high-level task). Stimulus awareness was mea- sured by means of the four-point Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). The results showed that low or moderate stimulus visibility was reported more frequently in the low-level task than in the high-level task, suggesting that the transition from unconscious to conscious perception is more gradual in the former than in the latter. Therefore, although alternative interpretations remain possible, the results of the present study fully support the LoP hypothesis.

Demoulin, C., & Kolinsky, R. (2016, in press). Does learning to read shape verbal working memory? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review . DOI 10.3758/s13423-015-0956-7. Many experimental studies have investigated the relationship between the acquisition of reading and working memory in a unidirectional way, attempting to determine to what extent individual differences in working memory can predict reading achievement. In contrast, very little attention has been dedicated to the converse possibility that learning to read shapes the development of verbal memory processes. In this paper, we present available evidence that advocates a more prominent role for reading acquisition on verbal working memory and then discuss the potential mechanisms of such literacy effects. First, the early decoding activities might bolster the development of subvocal rehearsal, which, in turn, would enhance serial order performance in immediate memory tasks. In addition, learning to read and write in an alphabetical system allows the emergence of phonemic awareness and finely tuned phonological representations, as well as of orthographic representations. This could improve the quality, strength, and precision of lexical representations, and hence offer better support for the temporary encoding of memory items and/or for their retrieval.

Raes, A. K., De Houwer, J., De Schryver, M., Brass, M., & Kalisch, R. (2014). Do CS-US pairings actually matter? A within-subject comparison of instructed fear conditioning with and without actual CS-US pairings. PLoS ONE 9(1): e84888. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084888

Previous research showed that instructions about CS-US pairings can lead to fear of the CS even when the pairings are never presented.In the present study, we examined whether the experience of CS-US pairings adds to the effect of instructions by comparing instructed conditioning with and without actual CS-US pairings in a within-subject design. Thirty-two participants saw three fractals as CSs (CS+1, CS+2, CS-) and received electric shocks as USs. Before the start of a so-called training phase, participants were instructed that both CS+1 and CS+2 would be followed by the US, but only CS+1 was actually paired with the US. The absence of the US after CS+2 was explained in such a way that participants would not doubt the instructions about the CS+2-US relation. After the training phase, a test phase was carried out. In this phase, participants expected the US after both CS+s but none of the CS+s was actually paired with the US. During test, self-reported fear was initially higher for CS+1 than for CS+2, which indicates that the experience of actual CS-US pairings adds to instructions about these pairings. On the other hand, the CS+s elicited similar skin conductance responses and US expectancies. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.

Gaillard, V., Cleeremans, A., & Destrebecqz, A. (2014). Dissociating conscious and unconscious learning with objective and subjective measures. Clinical EEG and Neuroscience, 45(1), 50-56.

Abstract:

According to functionalist theories, consciousness can be defined by the functions that it serves and by the way it contributes to cognition. For example, when trying to establish dissociations between conscious and unconscious knowledge, conscious representations would be identified by the fact that they allow cognitive control or successful identification or recollection, assessed by verbal reports or forced-choice tasks. Even though the functionalist approach has brought about important dissociation results concerning conscious and unconscious cognition, critics emphasize that it does not account for the qualitative properties of conscious experience. Phenomenal theories are precisely based on the notion that conscious representations are such that it feels like something to have these representations. Thus, one way to assess conscious knowledge is to ask people, after they have produced a forced-choice response, to identify their mental states through the use of subjective confidence ratings, in which they discriminate between a complete guess and a response based on some feeling of knowing. However, these 2 approaches are not mutually exclusive. In this article, we review a series of studies showing that the joint use of objective judgments about some external stimuli and about one’s own subjective knowledge concerning these stimuli, provides new insights into the putative dissociation between conscious and unconscious knowledge in learning.